It’s All a Matter of Perspective: Attempting to Reinterpret Japan’s Constitution

Most of us know the history, or at least the abridged version, of the Pacific Theater in World War II. Japan became increasingly militaristic in the 1920s and 1930s and went on to invade other parts of Asia before finally deciding to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor. In response, the Americans declared war on Japan and Germany, which after countless battles fought and lives lost would finally end after the Americans dropped the atomic bomb on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result, the Japanese surrendered to Allied forces and established a constitution that, among many things, attempts to prevent any militaristic tendencies from ever occurring again. The part of Japan’s Constitution most important in limiting future aggression is Chapter II, Article 9, which states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

However, since the constitution’s passage there has been constant debate on how to effectively interpret and implement policy under Article 9 given real world predicaments. In response to various political and security situations around the globe that both directly and indirectly affect Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reconvened the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (established back in 2007 during his first term as Prime minister) early last year to revisit the legality of actions taken in regard to security. Finally, last month on May 15 the panel revealed their findings and recommendations to the Prime Minister.

The entire document can be found here, but to summarize the main theme: the panel argues that if the government accepts a reinterpretation of the constitution, certain actions that are currently considered to be unconstitutional are, in fact, admissible. One obvious benefit of a reinterpretation is that by simply interpreting the meaning differently, the Abe government does not need to seek a constitutional amendment, something that would be much more difficult to secure.

In part one of the report, the panel gives a brief history of Japan’s interpretation of its constitution. Directly after World War II, it was suggested that Article 9 was to be followed in its strictest sense, meaning that even in regards to self-defense no force could be used. However with the establishment of the United Nations and the advent of the Cold War, this reading of Article 9 was quickly replaced to allow for self-defense. As the Cold War progressed, the debate eventually moved to question the constitutionality of both self-defense and collective self-defense, or simply the defense of one’s allies. Yet from the 1950s until present day, collective self-defense has never been granted the same legal status as self-defense.

The panel suggests that such a discrepancy is unreasonable and potentially harmful to Japan’s security. A frequently quoted example portraying Japan’s current limits is the possibility of North Korea, or another country, firing a missile toward the United States. The current constitutional interpretation prevents the Japanese government from shooting down the missile on behalf of the Americans because such action is a use of force outside the self-defense definition. In other words, the missile is not directed at Japan so the Japanese cannot act. For Abe and the advisory group other elements of Japan’s Constitution, specifically the preamble, Article 13, Article 98, and those areas supporting international cooperation, supersede the limiting factors of Article 9.

Nonetheless, it is unlikely that drastic changes will occur quickly. Following the report’s release discussions within the Diet are being held and Abe, well aware of the extreme pacifism held by some coalition members, will have to take baby steps in securing change. Protests by Diet members and the public have also already occurred since the panel shared its recommendations. However, Abe has had a degree of success over the past two years in security matters including the passage of a secrecy bill, establishment of a National Security Council and more recently, the decision to remove a self-imposed ban on exporting weapons. With the above mentioned successes, it certainly seems possible that some panel recommendations will be considered in the Diet and that Japan under Abe will continue to look for a more proactive role in world affairs.

Sean Mulvihill